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EXPLANATION OP WHY REPLY BRIEF IS BY APPELLANT 
This is an explanation of why this is written by, Jack L. 
Jones the appellant, instead of an attorney. Jack is under the 
financial hardship of paying high alimony fees, child support and 
attorney fees. Jack does not have the funds to pay an attorney 
to answer Diane's brief. Jack himself will therefore answer 
Diane's brief. Jack asks the court of appeals that it not be too 
critical of his writing as Jack is not an attorney. 
NOTE: In this document, the Defendant & Appellant, Jack Lloyd 
Jones, will be referred to as "Jack" and the Plaintiff & 
Appellee, Diane Sharon Jones, will be referred to as "Diane." 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OP PACTS 
Diane states, in her brief, the same facts and arguments over and 
over again. In fact her brief reads like a broken record. In 
Diane's introduction she states that she disagrees with Jack's 
statement of facts. The facts of this case are clear. 
Facts of the Case 
Jack and Diane were divorced in September 1992. At that time Jack 
and Diane agreed to the terms of the divorce. Jack, Diane and 
their attorneys signed and agreed to the STIPULATION FOR DIVORCE 
AGREEMENT.(R137) That agreement stated the following: At the time 
the Divorce was final, Jack's monthly income was $4300 and 
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Diane's monthly income was $80• Jack was to pay Diane child 
support in accordance the guide lines in the State of Utah($430). 
Jack was to pay Diane $650 alimony until her income increased. 
The agreement gave Jack the right to obtain Diane's business 
records every six months so that he could monitor Diane's income. 
When that income increased, the agreement allowed Jack to ask the 
court, by way of a motion, for a decrease or termination of 
alimony. In April of 1993 Jack obtained Diane's business 
records. Those records stated that Diane's monthly income from 
her law practice had raised to $1,408.(R246) That was a 
seventeen-fold increase in Diane's monthly income. On June 10, 
1993, Jack petitioned the court for a modification of divorce 
decree to decrease or terminate alimony.(R250) Diane then 
requested all of Jack's personal records.(R275) Jack supplied 
all that he had.(R277) Jack responded with a certificate of 
readiness and requested a hearing.(R278) Diane responded with an 
objection to readiness and motion to compel.(R279) Simply stated 
Diane wanted more records from Jack. Jack had provided all that 
he had and Diane wanted more. The record from R281 dated 
September 8f 1993 through R355 December deals with Diane's 
attempt to obtain more records from Jack, that he simply did not 
have in his possession. The records that Diane asked for were 
records that had no relevance to this case. It was simply Diane's 
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way to delay a decrease in alimony. On July 20, 1994, we went to 
a Pre-trial Conference before Commissioner Evans. Commissioner 
Evans recommended a decrease in alimony and certified the matter 
for trial because Diane would not accept that decrease.(R3 90) 
The court set our case for trial on October 21 and 27 of 1994. 
In August 1994 Jack requested and received from Diane, her 
current business records. Those records showed Diane's income 
had increased to $2213 this included child support of $430 from 
Jack. Diane had increased her expenses to $2221. The increases 
were because Diane's auto expenses went up to $584. This was 
because Diane bought an automobile valued more than $20,000. 
(R384-386) 
Simple Statement of Case Issues 
Jack agreed to pay Diane alimony of $650 per month when they 
were divorced. However only until her income increased. That 
alimony would be based on her income and expenses.(R143-144) 
Diane's base line monthly income, for the start of alimony, 
was $80.00. This is called out in The Stipulation for Entry of 
Decree of Divorce that Jack, Diane and both of their attorneys 
agreed to and signed.(R137) 
On a petition to modify alimony, the moving party must show 
a substantial change in circumstances. Jack has shown a very 
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substantial change. By using Diane's own figures(R384-386) 
Diane's monthly income has changed from $80.00 to $2213.(R507) 
That is an increase of $2133 or a 27-fold increase. 
Diane convinced the Trial Court that her baseline monthly 
income was more than $80.00. The Trial Court disregarded the 
fact that Diane's baseline monthly income was $80.00. This is a 
fact that was agreed to and cannot be relitigated. It is res 
judicata. It is a part of the contract agreement that Jack and 
Diane agreed to and signed.(R143) When the trial court found that 
Diane's baseline monthly income was more than $80.00 it nullified 
that part of the contract agreement. 
In the original Motion, Jack requested that alimony be 
terminated or decreased. (R241) The Trial Court totally 
disregarded and dismissed Jack's request for a decrease in 
alimony. The Trial Court simply dismissed all that Jack 
requested. The Trial Court did not even address the issue of a 
decrease in alimony. That leaves the issue of decreased alimony 
hanging and unresolved. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DIANE'S CONTENTION THAT THE PARTIES CONTEMPLATED HER FUTURE 
INCOME TO REDUCE ALIMONY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND 
IS A MATERIAL FACTUAL ISSUE TO WHICH THERE IS A GENUINE 
DISPUTE. 
At the time of the divorce negotiations, on February 6, 
1992, Diane stated in her financial declaration, that her 
business was running at a deficit and not even covering monthly 
expenses. (R81-88) Less than four months later, on April 28, 
Diane supplied information about her business finances. From 
that confusing information Jack's attorney tried to produce a 
document that stated Diane's income.(R439) When presented with 
this document, Diane and her attorney stated that it had no truth 
to it. Diane and her attorney stated over and over that Diane was 
not earning income from her law practice. In the final 
negotiations in September 1992, Diane and her attorney made the 
same statements. Diane and her attorney also stated that all of 
her income was being eaten up by her high start up costs and 
there was no income from that source. 
If that document was true, Diane was making income and Diane 
and her attorney lied about, they then signed a divorce contract 
with Jack stating that Diane's monthly income was $80 from 
boarding horses. Whether Diane was earning income from her law 
practice or not, it makes no difference. Diane still must be 
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bound by the divorce contract that states her baseline monthly 
income was $80.00. The court must to bind her to that contract. 
There is a very large factual dispute in this case and Diane 
states there is no genuine issue of fact. Jack contends that 
alimony was based on her $80.00 income and the property 
settlement Diane received. It was a package deal.(R 499) In the 
record (R520) Diane disputes that alimony was set based on her 
$80.00 income and the property settlement she received. That is 
an issue of contention that precludes a Summary Judgment by its 
self. 
Diane argues, at the time of the divorce, without income 
from her law practice she would not be able to make ends meet. 
Diane had chosen to start a law practice instead of finding 
employment.(R423) Because of this, Diane agreed to a settlement 
of support that was a little less her expenses. Diane felt that 
it was to her advantage to start that business instead of 
accepting employment. At that time Diane had been given a cash 
settlement more than Fourteen Thousand Dollars.(R143) Therefore 
a settlement, a little short of total support, was no big thing 
to Diane. Diane now, after the fact is looking for any reason to 
state that she was making income from her law practice. If Diane 
was earning income from that her law practice she hid it from 
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Jack, By hiding that income she must be bound by the terms to 
the contract that she agreed to and signed. That contract states 
that her baseline monthly income for alimony calculation was 
$80.00(R143) 
The record clearly states that when Diane's monthly income 
increased, alimony would be decreased based on her ability to 
provide for her own support. The record also clearly states that 
the base line for that increase was a monthly income of $80.00. 
(R. 143-144) The "$80.00 monthly income" is in the Divorce 
Decree and is a point that cannot be relitigated. If the court 
finds that Diane's baseline monthly income is above $80.00, it is 
nullifying that part of the Divorce Decree agreement. Diane 
agreed on page 34 of her brief that her baseline income was 
$80.00, that, therefore is no longer a disputed fact. 
Diane uses the cases of Moore v Moore and Dana v Dana. 
The Moore v Moore and Dana v Dana cases are not applicable. 
The "Dana" case is not applicable as it does not have language in 
the divorce papers allowing for a decrease. It is concerning 
child support and not alimony. The Dana case did not involve a 
Summary Judgment. The "Moore" case is not applicable because 
its divorce documents did not provide for changing alimony from 
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time to time as this case does. Alimony was permanent in the 
Moore case and it was not settled by a Summary Judgment. 
The issues of contention in our case would not exist if 
there had been a trial because they would have been settled by a 
trial. This case had no trial and the court did not contemplate 
anything about alimony at the time of divorce. 
Diane states that "The parties did not attribute any income 
to her from her law practice in the written agreement due to the 
short time she had been practicing law." That is totally false. 
No income was attributed to her, because she claimed over and 
over there was no income after start up costs. 
II. JACK REQUESTED A TERMINATION OR REDUCTION IN ALIMONY IN HIS 
PETITION TO THE COURT AND IN OPPOSING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THE SAME FACTS WHICH SHOW HIS 
ENTITLEMENT TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ALSO SHOW THE 
EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT, SHOULD THE COURT FIND 
ALIMONY TERMINATION INAPPROPRIATE. 
Diane states that ''Jack never asked" for a reduction of 
alimony only termination. Jack did petition for a reduction or 
termination of alimony. (R242 & R367) However, the same 
arguments for termination are valid for a The same arguments that 
weigh in favor of the termination of alimony, also weigh in favor 
of reduction. It is only a matter of degree. 
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Simply because Jack asked for a yard, he should not be denied a 
foot. 
If the court finds that termination is not appropriate, 
there are sufficient disputations of material facts to require 
the court to remand for a trial on these issues. 
A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OP CIRCUMSTANCES HAS OCCURRED NOT 
CONTEMPLATED IN THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE DECREE ITSELF. 
Diane's baseline monthly income was $80.00. It is now 
$2,212. That is more than a 27-fold increase or an increase of 
$2,132. That is a very substantial change. The Utah code does 
not set a standard of for a change in alimony. However in the 
absence of another standard it says that a change of 25% is 
enough to change Child Support. It is therefore logical to assume 
that a 25% increase in Diane's income is a substantial change. 
Even if the court finds that Diane's baseline monthly income is, 
what she infers $872.(R429) Her present income of $2213 is a 
substantial change. As a matter of law, Jack in entitled to a 
decrease in alimony. 
Diane contends that her law income plus child support does 
not cover her living expenses. Using Diane's own figures, the 
following is true. Her increased income is $2,213.(R454) Diane's 
expenses are ($2,221) that includes the expenses for the $20,000 
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Explorer that should not be allowed. (R456) There is only a 
difference of seven dollars. Diane's own figures prove that she 
is not in need of alimony. 
Diane contends that she is not making enough for living 
expenses, is not true. If you look at Diane's expense statement 
there is even fat in it. Diane even has a savings account and a 
large amount for entertainment.(R4554456) 
If the court finds that an increase in Diane's income below 
total support does not qualify for a decrease in alimony it makes 
nullity of the reduction language in the Divorce decree. To 
restate this issue, if the court finds that there is not enough 
change in Diane's income to warrant alimony termination. And if 
the Court does not order a decrease in alimony. It is nullifying 
the reduction language in the Divorce Decree.(R162) 
Diane argues that Her increased income from law practice was 
contemplated in the Divorce Decree. It is true that the parties 
did contemplate that Diane's income would increase. Diane's 
future increase in income was only contemplated in the divorce 
for the purpose of reduction of alimony. The divorce papers 
(R144) state the reason why Diane's future income increase was 
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contemplated. It states in clear terms that Diane's income was 
contemplated for the reduction or termination of alimony and no 
other reason. Diane and the Trial Court misinterpret what should 
happen with that increase. The Divorce agreement makes it clear 
what would happen as Diane's income increased. (R143&144) It 
states that as Diane's income increased the alimony would be 
decreased. (R162) The Trial Court made an error when it used 
that contemplation for another purpose. When the Trial Court did 
this, it nullified that portion of the contract. 
Ill DIANE'S PETITION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN DENIED BECAUSE THERE ARE MANY DISPUTE ISSUES AND 
FACTS THAT SHOULD BE SETTLED IN A TRIAL. 
The first reason Diane's Motion for Summary Judgment should 
not be allowed is supported by the statements made by Diane in 
her "Statement of Facts" on page 2 of her brief she states that 
"however, she disagrees with Jack's statement of facts." That 
means that there are genuine disputed facts in this case, as 
there was always. 
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DIANE'S INCOME CHANGED FROM $80 TO $2213 
Diane contends that there has not been a substantial change that 
was not contemplated by the parties at the time of the divorce. 
Diane's income increase was not contemplated at the time of the 
divorce to reduce the amount of alimony. The amounts of alimony 
were set by Diane's current income and the large property and 
cash settlement that Diane received. This is a disputed fact 
that precludes summary judgment. 
Jack showed large changes in Diane's income and her ability 
to support herself. Diane's income increased from $80 to $2213. 
Diane's expenses are $2221. This is a disputed fact that 
precludes summary j udgment. 
Diane argues that her income was something more than $80.00 
at the time the divorce was final. The record is very clear that 
it was $80. The court should hold Diane to the agreement that 
states very clearly that it was only $80.00. If the court finds 
that Diane's income was above $80. It would not change the 
results. If Diane's income was not $80.00 and was something 
above that, we look to the record for the amount.(R263) The 
record (Diane's 1992 tax return) states Diane's annual income 
from her Law Practice was $6231. That is equal to $519 monthly 
income. Diane's present law practice income from the record is 
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$1773.(R507) That is an increase of $1,253. That is about double 
the amount Jack is paying in alimony. That is 3.4 fold 
increases. Even using Diane's figures, it is a very substantial 
increase. That increase covers Dianes current expenses and 
warrants termination of alimony. 
DIANE'S INCREASED AUTO EXPENSES ARE NOT LEGITIMATE 
Diane contends that her car expenses are within the standard 
within the marriage. Jack contends that Diane bought a car worth 
more than $20,000. Diane did not dispute that. Jack contends 
that was above the standard set by the marriage. Diane increased 
her monthly auto expenses to $584.(R509) She bought a car that 
has a price more than four times any owned by the marriage. 
Jack contends that was far above the standard set by the 
marriage. The record states, that the most expensive car enjoyed 
during the marriage was purchased for $5000. (R501) It is 
reasonable to expect that in a trial the court would define less 
than half of that expense as allowable. 
DIANE'S ATTORNEY PEES ARE QUESTIONABLE AND NOT LEGITIMATE 
Amount and validity Diane's attorney fees are questionable. 
It is inappropriate for Jack to be required to pay Diane's 
attorney fees since the motion to reduce or terminate alimony was 
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not frivolous or brought in bad faith as shown by the arguments 
herein. The court should have, at minimum, addressed the issue 
of decreasing alimony. If there was enough merit to decrease 
alimony by only a small amount, the suit has merit. 
Diane did not spend any out of pocket cash on attorneys' 
fees.(R692) She did it all with traded services. Those traded 
services were not included in her income statements. If Diane 
was awarded attorney fees of the amount awarded by the court that 
raises her income by more than $4,000. This by its self should 
raise Diane's income level enough to support a reduction in 
alimony. 
Diane argues that she turned away paying clients to pay for 
this case. Jack contends that could not be true. If she did, she 
was not working many hours per month. Diane states that she is 
only earning $1773 per month at $100 per hour(Diane's Rate). That 
is only 17.7 hours. Most people work that much in three days. 
Diane's attorney fees therefore did not cost her anything and she 
should not have been awarded attorney fees. 
THE TRIAL COURT DENIED ALIMONY REDUCTION 
The exact same arguments that weigh in favor of a 
termination of alimony also weigh in favor of a reduction in 
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alimony and/or denial of Diane's motion for summary judgment. 
The Trial Court, in considering Diane's motion, was obligated to 
view all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Her motion was to dismiss the entire petition for termination or 
reduction. The facts shown in the memoranda and affidavits to 
the Trial Court, show that at a minimum, there was a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether the parties reduced Diane's alimony 
award in contemplation of her future income, and that this issue 
should go to a trial. 
IV DIANE'S BRIEF IS APPALLING AS IT CONTAINS FALSE FACTS 
AND HALF TRUTHS, IT INCLUDES MANY FACTS THAT ARE NOT 
IN RECORD. IT ALSO INCLUDES INFORMATION TOTALLY 
IRRELEVANT AND UNIMPORTANT. 
Diane includes, in her brief, the following information that 
is false, not in the record and is not relevant to this case. 
Diane states "Diane's income from boarding horses was 
terminated because the land was sold and the proceeds went to 
Jack." At the time of divorce negotiations, Jack had no 
knowledge that the horse boarding income had stopped. If he had, 
he could not have signed those documents as true. You see Diane 
had other property that she could have used for boarding horses. 
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This is not relevant as Jack had no knowledge that the horse 
income stopped. 
Diane states that the marital estate was worth $200,000. 
This is far inflated. The true figures are in the record. (R675) 
Diane states that the material estate was not split evenly. Diane 
is playing on the emotions of the court by trying to say that the 
marital estate was not split 50/50. The record states things were 
split 50/50. (R140&675) However, if any thing Jack came up 
short, the value of Diane's law degree was never valued or taken 
into account. Diane states that her law degree was paid for by 
the state of Alaska. The only part of the law degree that was 
paid for by the state of Alaska was the difference between 
resident and nonresident for the first nine months. Diane had 
residential status after that time. The rest was paid for by 
Jack. This is just another example where Diane tells only half 
and is twisting the truth to make her self look good. However, 
these things are immaterial and are not in the record. 
Diane contends that Jack never tried to settle this case. That 
is totally false. The court record does not show the attempts by 
Jack to settle this case as they were never made part of the 
court record. However, this Jack constantly did make attempts 
to sette this case since June of 1993. Jack made an offer to 
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terminate alimony without being retroactive in July of 1994. If 
alimony was terminated on July 20, 1994, it would be a reduction 
in alimony. That is what Jack offered. This part is not 
relevant, because this was only a part the negotiations, that 
were unsuccessful. 
Diane states that "Commissioner Michael Evans 
recommended that alimony be reduced $80 to $100 per month." Here 
Diane is mistaken about the truth. When we were before 
Commissioner Evans, he stated that alimony should be decreased 
from $680. However he wQuld not make a recommendation of how 
much alimony should be decreased.(R390) Commissioner certified 
that issue for trial. This part is not relevant because the 
Commissioner's recommendation means nothing at this point. 
Diane contends that Jack falsified information. Jack simply 
mixed up his papers. In supplying information Jack mixed his 
real tax and income records and used one of those "what if 
scenarios" as the real tax return. It was a mistake that was 
corrected as soon as it was discovered. Diane's tried to make a 
big deal out of it. Diane's position was not hurt in any way by 
the mistake. It is the amount of Diane's income that is 
questionable, not Jack's. Jack's income is only relevant, in 
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that it shows his ability to pay alimony. That is not contested. 
Therefore how much Jack earns is not relevant. 
Diane contends that on March 12, 1993 Jack called her and 
said some threatening things. This information is totally false. 
Yes, Jack made a phone call, on March 12, 1993, and all Jack 
stated is "that it was unfair for him to pay alimony when Diane 
had a man living with her." Diane was cohabiting at the time. 
This made Diane so angary that she must have called the police 
and lied, out of anger. There was never a restraining order 
issued that Jack was aware of. If there was a restraining order 
it was never served, in anyway communicated to Jack. This part 
is not relevant. 
Diane states that "Jack regrets having agreed to the payment 
of alimony and wishes he had gone to trial. Yes, Jack wishes he 
had gone to trial with this case. But that was not an option 
because at that time, he was told by his attorney that the Judge 
would not hear this case. His attorney stated that the Judge 
ordered us to settle it. At a trial the truth about Diane's lack 
of income would have come out. Or Diane's income would have been 
documented and there would be no alimony. Either way would be 
better than going through what Jack is going through. This part 
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is not relevant because the way Jack feels about does not matter. 
Diane states that Jack filed to terminate alimony.lt is very 
clear, as the record shows, Jack filed a motion to terminate or 
reduce alimony. (R242&367) 
Diane contends that Jack with held information and would not 
cooperate with discovery. That is simply not true. Jack provided 
every thing that his attorney requested at the time of the 
request. The problem is that Diane requested many things that 
Jack did not have or it did not exist. This part is not 
relevant, because the things that Diane asked Jack to supply, 
were not relevant to that case. 
Diane contends that Jack amended his petition twice. Jack 
did amend his petition twice. That is because his attorney made a 
mistake in the first modification and it had to be done again. 
This part is not relevant that Jack amended his petition. 
Diane contends that Jack did not pursue any discovery until 
August 15, 1994. Jack did not have to pursue formal discovery to 
obtain Diane's records. The divorce decree allows Jack access to 
Diane's records every six months.(R144) All Jack needs to do is 
send a letter requesting that information from Diane's attorney. 
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It is not relevant when Jack pursued discovery in fact it is not 
necessary that Jack pursue discovery at all if Jack has all the 
information he needs for his case without it. 
INFORMATION THAT IS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT 
Diane includes in her brief the following information that 
is immaterial and irrelevant to this case. 
Diane contends that Jack asked for her business one month 
the after entry of the decree. Yes, Jack, at the advice of his 
attorney, made a request for Diane's business records on November 
25, 1992. It had been seven months since Jack had any of Diane's 
business records. Jack and his attorney felt he was entitled to 
them. This is not relevant because it is not important when Jack 
ask for the records. 
Diane contends that Jack was behind in his support payments. 
Jack was never behind in support payments as called out in the 
divorce papers. Being behind in support payments has nothing to 
do with the fact that Diane was earning enough to support 
herself. It is therefore not relevant. 
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Diane states that "Jack filed his petition to terminate 
alimony June 18, 1993 eight months after the decree was 
entered.'' In fact Jack filed a petition to terminate or reduce 
alimony as Diane's income had increased a great deal. (R240) 
V THE TRIAL COURT LOOKED BEYOND THE SIGNED DOCUMENTS 
AND RELITIGATED THE ISSUES SETTLED BY THE ORIGINAL 
DIVORCE AGREEMENT. 
Diane's monthly income was $80.00 at the time of the 
divorce. That cannot be disputed as it was signed and stipulated 
by Diane and her attorney at the time of divorce. Diane and her 
attorney agreed to that fact, and now she is trying to prove 
those facts false. Diane tries to document that her income was 
much more. However, the one thing she uses is a paper that was 
prepared by Jack's attorney. This paper was prepared for 
negotiations only and Diane and her attorney stated over and over 
that it was not valid. If it was valid, Jack would have never 
agreed to pay alimony. Diane agreed to this fact on page 34 of 
her brief. 
Diane contends that at the time of the divorce she was 
making income from her law practice. If this was true, she was 
dishonest about her income at the time of the divorce. In any 
case Diane's monthly income was settled and litigated by the 
divorce and Diane cannot change that fact. Diane's monthly 
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income has increased from $80.00 to more than $2,213* That is a 
27-fold increase. Diane contends that there has not been a 
significant increase. That is a very significant increase and it 
is a very large disputed fact. 
Diane deliberately raised her monthly expenses by purchasing 
a vehicle worth more than $20,000. During the marriage the most 
they paid for a car was $5,000. Diane contends that this was a 
proper expense. Jack disagrees and wants this disallowed. That 
is a disputed fact and therefor summary judgment is not proper. 
CONCLUSION 
The existence of genuine issues of material facts does preclude 
the entry of summary judgement. When those facts are what the 
case is based on. The trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment to Diane and denying Jack's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Therefore, Defendant requests the court to reverse the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Diane and remand 
the case to the trial court for entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Jack or for trial to determine the proper amount of 
alimony reduction. 
22 
DATED this day of SEPTEMBER, 1995 
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